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“People as Root” (min ben) Rhetoric in the New Writings  
by Jia Yi (200-168)
Elisa Sabattini 1
The origins of the question
The ancient Chinese expression min ben sixiang, usually translated as “the 
idea of the people as root,” 2 experienced a revival in China starting from the early 
twentieth century, when it was introduced into the debate on democracy, and later 
into that on human rights, as a useful tool in the context of a modern political 
discourse. 3 Seeking democratic seeds 4 in past Chinese political thought, modern-
day reformers and revolutionaries reinterpreted the idea of good government 
derived from “the people as root” (min ben) concept. The common interpretation 
of this expression, which usually has a positive connotation, is that it concerns 
the ruler’s responsibility for the people’s welfare and satisfaction. However, 
1.	 This	paper	was	irst	presented	at	the	conference	“Rhetoric	as	a	Political	Tool	in	Early	
China,” Jerusalem, May 2011. I want to thank the conference participants, especially Romain	Graziani	and	Yuri	Pines,	as	well	as	Carine	Defoort,	Maurizio	Scarpari	and	the	
two Extrême-Orient, Extrême-Occident reviewers, for their incisive comments and 
remarks on earlier drafts of this paper.
2. In modern times, many Chinese expressions and neologisms are related to min ben, for 
instance minben zhuyi meaning “democracy.” This connection with the modern idea of 
democracy has led to a misunderstanding of the original use of the min ben concept.
3. There is extensive literature on the controversial Confucianism and democracy debate. See,	for	example,	Xu	Fuguan	[1953]	1988;	Mou	Zongsan	1961;	Jin	Yaoji	(=	Ambrose	Y.C.	King)	[1964]	1993;	Fukuyama	1995:	20-33;	Bloom	1998:	10;	Ching	1998:	67-82;	Judge	1998:	193-208;	Hall	and	Ames	1999;	Zhao	Suisheng	2000;	Tan	Sor-Hoon	2003;	Yang	Qingqiu	2005.	On	related	topics,	Billioud	and	Thoraval	2009.	On	the	notion	of	
“the people as root” (min ben)	in	Chinese	intellectual	history:	You	Huanmin	1991;	Xia	Yong	2004:	4-32;	Zhang	Fentian	2009.	See	also	Liang	Qichao	1996.4.	 It	 is	 interesting	to	underline	 that	Liang	Qichao’s	use	of	min ben was translated as 
“democratic ideas” by Chen in the translation of his History of Chinese Political Thought 
during the Early Tsin Periods.	Liang	Qichao	1930:	150-152.
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even though the belief that the people are the country’s underpinnings is part 
of pre-imperial and imperial thought, it was only in the early twentieth century 
that Chinese scholars raised “people as root” to the status of key concept in the 
country’s early political thinking. 5 Even today, many scholars analyse the ideas 
of the “people as root” and “government for the people” in the context of the idea 
of popular sovereignty. 6	Contemporary	scholars	also	afirm	that	the	existence	
of the notion of “people as root” might even testify to the existence of a sort of 
embryonic or potential democracy in ancient China.	7 It is important to underline 
5.	 Pines	2009:	187.	See	also	Zhang	Fentian	2009:	1.	In	the	late	Qing	period,	journalists	
from the Shanghai Daily Shibao (The Eastern Times) discussing the topic of “right thinking,”	equated	China’s	“ancient	constitutionalism,”	or	the	classical	theory	of	the	“people	as	root,”	with	modern	Western	constitutionalism.	See	Judge	1998:	193-194.	
Judge says that the Shibao	 journalists	did	not	write	extensively	or	explicitly	about	
human rights (renquan) per se. They “advocated the assertion of minquan which they related	to	the	principles	of	the	‘Declaration	of	the	Rights	of	Man’	and	the	urgent	need	to	develop	constitutional	rights	in	China.”	Judge	1998:	193.	These	journalists	were	trained	
in Western social and political theory but they also studied Chinese classical texts, and were	not	alienated	from	the	Chinese	cultural	tradition.	They	injected	traditional	precepts	with	Western	ideas	based	on	constitutional	principles.	According	to	Joan	Judge,	the	
result was tension rather than fusion, and there were many contradictions between the 
inherited ideal of harmony between ruler and ruled, and the promotion of a new form 
of public policy. See	Judge	1998:	193-194.	This	approach	was	a	response	both	to	the	failure	of	late	Qing	policies	and	to	the	invasion	of	the	country	by	Western	powers	who	
introduced their social and political theories.
6. Some scholars go so far in their mental and linguistic acrobatics as to associate one of 
the Chinese translations of “democracy,” minzhu or minquan, with the notion of min 
ben,	skipping	the	logical	step	in	their	reasoning	that	would	make	the	equation	plausible.	
For instance, Viren Murthy claims that “The Chinese term for democracy, minzhu, is a	combination	of	two	characters:	min meaning people, and zhu, meaning rule or ruler. Although	this	is	a	modern	term,	a	related	word,	min ben, ‘people as root,’ existed since at	least	the	Han	dynasty	and	the	idea	was	ascribed	to	Confucius	[Kongzi]	(551-479	BC),	developed	and	reined	by	Mencius	[Mengzi]	(372-289	BC).”	Murthy	2000:	33.	
Joan Judge also states that “their [Shibao	journalists]	understanding	of	minquan as a 
synthesis between the age-old min ben	ethos	of	the	uniication	of	ruler	and	ruled,	and	
new foreign-inspired ideas of democracy (minzhu) based on constitutional principles, 
gave rise to a new form of political dualism which would serve to maintain the state 
structure (guoti)	while	formalizing	and	rationalizing	its	operation	(guozheng).” Judge 1998:	198.7.	 See,	for	example,	Murthy	2000.	Tan	Sor-hoon	2003:	132-156.	Gung-Hsing	Wang	even	maintains	that	Mencius	was	“the	irst	scholar	in	China	who	instilled	the	democratic	spirit	
into our humanistic thought.” In the work edited by Zhao Suisheng, Enbao Wang and Regina	F.	Titunik,	much	is	made	of	the	democratic	value	of	the	concept	of	min ben and a section	is	even	entitled	“Mencius’s	Notion	of	Democracy.”	Moreover,	Wang	and	Titunik	
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that the modern use of the term “democracy” is anachronistic and misleading 
not only because political and social conditions have changed since ancient Greece,	but	also	because	scholars	tend	to	apply	the	modern	and	contemporary	
Western meaning to ancient China.
The debate is very lively even today, both in the West and in the East, and 
one of the results is that the “people as the root” of the country is considered 
one of the key concepts in Chinese political culture if not the most important. 8 
However, most scholars of ancient Chinese political thought are reluctant to endorse	these	equations. 9 I aim to show that the notion of min ben can easily 
become a rhetorical device and a catchphrase used by persuaders from the past. 
The improper use of min ben today distracts from the varied and interesting 
nuances of its meanings, especially in early Han (206 BCE-9 CE) political rhetoric.	With	few	exceptions	neither	the	late	Qing	(1644-1911)	revision	of	the	
notion of the “people as root” nor the contemporary analysis consider the work of	Jia	Yi	(200-168	BCE). 10
interpret	Sun	Yat-sen’s	political	philosophy	expressed	in	the	concept	of	san min zhuyi 
(the three principles of the people—nationalism, democracy and people’s livelihood) 
in terms of “continuation and development of the traditional political philosophy of 
min ben.”	Wang	and	Titunik	2000:	80.	Although	in	their	analysis	of	the	uses	of	the	min 
ben concept in Chinese thought from ancient texts to the modern period, Wang and 
Titunik go so far as to assert that, “the concept of min ben may be understood in several interrelated	respects:	the	centrality	of	the	people	in	politics,	the	equality	of	the	people	
as regards their potential to be chosen by Heaven to rule, the importance of the popular 
legitimation of leaders and the validity of withdrawing that approval through rebellion” (2000:	80),	they	conclude	by	admitting:	“In	conclusion,	though	min ben is a theory that emphasizes	the	importance	of	the	people	in	a	state,	this	does	not	entirely	equate	with	a	
theory of governance that champions participation and governmental decision making 
by the people. […] Thus the view, according to which min ben anticipates modern democracy,	is	erroneous	in	certain	respects.	Yet	though	these	two	theories	of	government	diverge,	there	are	some	points	of	convergence	of	which	we	also	take	note.”	(2000:	84)	
Others have seen the notion of min ben as bearing the imprint of meritocratic thought 
and it is often linked to traditional Confucian theories, although it lacks one core element 
of liberal democracy—a concept of procedural rules applying to the executive arm of 
government, underpinned by a concept of the role of the legislature. See Fröhlich 2008.8.	 Pines	2009:	187.	See	Xia	Yong	2004:	4-32;	see	also	Zhang	Fentian	2009:	13.
9. See, for example, Zhang Fentian 2009.
10.	 For	example	Murthy	2000,	focuses	on	Jia	Yi.	However,	in	my	paper	I	dispute	his	analysis.	Sanft	has	devoted	the	irst	chapter	of	his	PhD	dissertation	to	the	idea	of	people	in	the	New 
Writings.	See	Sanft	2005a.	For	Jia	Yi’s	biography,	see	Shiji 84 and Hanshu 48. See also Emmerich	2007.	According	to	his	biography,	Jia	Yi,	born	in	Luoyang,	became	famous	
in his home commandery for his talent in composition and his skill in reciting the Shi 
and Shu.	Jia	Yi	was	also	a	specialist	of	the	Zuozhuan.	At	that	time,	the	administrator	of	
Elisa Sabattini
170
I	will	refrain	from	joining	the	discussion	on	“Confucian	democracy,”	and	I	
will focus on the rhetorical expression of min ben	in	the	“Great	Command,	Part	I”	
(Da zheng shang)	and	“Great	Command,	Part	II”	(Da zheng xia) chapters of the 
New Writings (Xin shu) 11	ascribed	to	Jia	Yi,	enfant prodige active at the court of Emperor	Wen	(r.	179-157 BCE). The conclusion shows that in the New Writings 
the appeal to “the people” 12 was due to its “emotive connotation” 13 rather than 
signifying a concrete set of people-oriented policies. It is my contention that 
the rhetorical strategy of changing the context or details, thus introducing a new 
“emotive meaning,” can be applied to the use of the term “people” as proposed by	Jia	Yi,	viewing	it	as	an	instrument	he	uses	to	reassess	the	young	Han	imperial	interests.	The	end	result	of	these	relections	is	the	rebuttal	of	the	view	that	in	some	sense	“the	people”	can	be	considered	as	preiguring	democratic	ideals.
Jia	Yi’s	commandery	was	Honourable	Wu.	He	heard	of	Jia	Yi’s	abilities	and	promoted	him	to	a	position	in	his	entourage.	Honourable	Wu	was	a	student	of	Li	Si	(d.	208 BCE), the	famous	Qin	minister.	Li	Si	himself	had	been	a	student	of	Xunzi	(ca 313-238 BCE). These	connections	allow	us	to	allocate	Jia	Yi,	who	was	in	favour	with	Honourable	Wu,	
within the Warring States’intellectual heritage. When Emperor Wen ascended the throne in	179	BCE, he heard of Honourable Wu because his administration was at peace and his	commandery	was	the	best	in	the	realm.	Wu	became	commandant	of	justice	and	once	at	court	he	recommended	Jia	Yi’s	learning	to	the	emperor,	who	as	a	result	appointed	Jia	Yi	to	the	position	of	court	savant.
11. In this paper I use the Jiazi Xin shu jiao shi	1974.	Hereafter,	I	will	refer	to	the	text	as	
Jiazi.	As	for	the	claim	the	New Writings	is	a	forgery,	I	have	conidence	in	a	number	of	studies	proving	that	the	contents	of	the	text	can	be	attributed	to	Jia	Yi;	see,	for	example,	Svarverud	1998.	Luo	Shaodan	2002	and	2003:	270-299.	For	a	study	on	the	Xin shu, see	Sanft	2005a.	As	for	the	texts	contained	in	this	œuvre,	some	of	them	were	memoirs	or	records	written	by	Jia	Yi	and	addressed	to	Emperor	Wen	(alias	Liu	Heng,	r.	179-157	BCE). The title of this compilation, Xin shu, does not refer to the content of these texts, but	simply	denotes	a	new	edition	with	annotations.	See	Cai	Tingji	1984:	23-27.	In	this	
paper I translate the title as New Writings	with	the	meaning	of	“New	Edition	of	Jia	Yi’s	
Writings.” In early Han, the practice of naming written works with “new edition” (xin 
shu) was common.
12. There is a vast body of literature on the meaning of min (people) in ancient China. For two	recent	studies,	which	differ	from	one	another,	see	Gassman	2000	and	Pines	2009:	
190-191.
13.	 Carine	Defoort	introduced	into	sinology	the	concept	of	“emotive	meaning”	developed	by	Stevenson	1937:	18;	1938.	See	Defoort	1997	and	2003:	393-413.	See	also	Schaberg	
2001.
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Rhetoric and its strategy
In ancient China, the period of the Warring States (453-221 BCE) led to a 
highly rhetorical form of argumentation that was practised by political counsellors 
and strategic advisors. 14 Freedom of argument was commonplace and persuasion 
was thus a popular rhetorical pursuit. This period, which is considered to be the 
golden age for the production of written materials, was characterised by free expression	and	critical	thinking.	Right	after	the	uniication	of	the	various	states	under	the	Qin	empire	(221-207 BCE), this situation, characterised by interstate 
diplomacy, no longer existed. From the former Han empire onwards, rhetoric as	persuasion	and	argumentation	was	part	of	the	relections	made	by	political	
counsellors’ on state policies and of the remonstrations made by ministers to their	emperors.	After	the	irst	decades	of	the	Han	empire,	“intellectuals” 15 were 
transformed from independent thinkers into state bureaucrats. It is in the early 
Han that intellectuals began to elevate the emperor above the rest of humanity. 16 
The power of the emperor directly affected the rhetorical style, so rhetoric was 
often an art of “criticism by indirection.”	17 In addition, rhetoric as the art of “criticism	by	indirection”	used	by	many	oficial	writings	argues	or	praises	with	the	intention	of	inluencing	the	audience.	We	might	surmise	that	those	trying	to	persuade	the	emperor	had	to	tread	carefully:	rhetoric	could	become	a	dangerous	
game or a death trap.Jia	Yi	was	a	young	erudite	politically	and	intellectually	active	at	the	beginning	
of the Han dynasty. He was both the heir of pre-imperial discussion and one of the	main	igures	in	the	rhetorical	argumentation	of	the	early	imperial	period.	According	to	the	Record of the Grand Historian (Shiji) and History of the Han 
(Hanshu),	Jia	Yi	was	an	expert	of	the	Odes (Shi) and Documents (Shu). 18 The 
History of the Han also notes that his speciality was the Commentary of Zuo 
(Zuozhuan) 19	and	classiies	Jia	Yi’s	works	under	the	ru (classicists, erroneously 
translated as “Confucians”) umbrella. 20 Thus, later scholars usually labelled his thought	as	“Confucian,”	and	mainly	related	it	to	that	of	Mengzi	(ca	379-304	BCE). However, the Record of the Grand Historian	also	registers	that	Jia	Yi	fully	understood	the	ideas	of	Shen	Buhai	(d.	337	BCE)	and	Shang	Yang	(d.	
14.	 Kao	[1986]	2003:	121.
15. On the term “intellectuals” in ancient China, see Cheng 1996.
16.	 See	Liu	Zehua	1992:	72-73.17.	 Kao	[1986]	2003:	121.
18. Shiji	84:	2491.	Hanshu	48:	2221.
19. Hanshu	88:	3620.
20. Hanshu	30:	1726.	On	the	meaning	of	ru, see Zufferey 2003.
Elisa Sabattini
172
338 BCE). 21	Jia	Yi’s	political	phraseology,	which	was	close	to	the	thought	of	Xunzi	and	also	to	that	of	statesmen	like	Shang	Yang,	Shen	Buhai,	Han	Feizi	(d.	
233 BCE), 22 must be considered under this heterogeneous light. 23 This is not 
a contradiction, but rather shows that is impossible to apply strict criteria for 
attributing a text from the early Han to a certain tradition.Although	Jia	Yi	 inherits	 the	Warring	States	 rhetorical	 formulation	and	
wording, he is part of the political discussion of the Former Han and thus his political	goal	differs	from	the	pre-imperial	one:	before	imperial	uniication	the	
main concern was how to pacify and unify the states under one government, while	during	the	early	decades	of	the	imperial	era	the	question	was	how	to	retain	
imperial power. In the New Writings, both the longevity of the dynasty and the centralisation	of	political	power	are	crucial	topics:	the	Han	imperial	house	was	only	a	few	decades	old	and	questions	of	political	stability	and	legitimacy	of	the	
Empire were given priority. 24	The	centre	of	Jia	Yi’s	political	thought	and	system	
is the ruler, and his discourse concerns the emperor’s political actions. The 
political nature of the New Writings lends itself to a focus on the rhetoric of the texts.	However,	studies	on	Jia	Yi’s	rhetoric	usually	focus	on	his	fu poems, a genre 
21. Shiji	130:	3319.	The	History of the Han	modiies	this	passage	and	refers	instead	to	Shen	Buhai	and	Han	Feizi.	See	Hanshu	62:	2723.
22. The New Writings share ideas also with The Pheasant Cap Master (He Guanzi) and the 
Wenzi, especially in the appeal for fear and caution before the ruler’s responsibilities. 
In addition, many ideas are similar to those theories developed in the text discovered 
at Mawangdui and known as the Silk Manuscript of Huang-Lao. On these texts, see Peerenboom	1993.	On	the	similarities	with	Jia	Yi,	see	also	Sabattini	2009.
23. In pre-imperial China and in the early years of the imperial period, clear distinctions between	so-called	“schools”	result	in	simpliications.
24.	 According	 to	 the	Shiji, one of the urgent matters pressed on Emperor Wen by his 
ministers was to establish the crown prince early. Shiji	10:	419.	It	is	possible	that	these	
ministers stressed the need to establish the heir because the hesitant attitude displayed formerly	by	Gaozu	of	Han	in	installing	his	successor	had	let	power	drift	into	the	hands	of	the	Empress	Lü.	These	ministers	were	also	interested	in	inluencing	Emperor	Wen’s	decisions	since	they	played	the	chief	role	both	in	toppling	the	clan	of	Empress	Lü	and	in	the	crowning	of	Emperor	Wen	himself.	Jia	Yi	took	part	in	this	discussion	and	formulated	
his theory of foetus instructions (taijiao) of the heir and moral education of the crown 
prince. Education in utero and the moral training of the crown prince were both related to the	selection	of	good	tutors	and	imperial	assistants.	Jia	Yi	singled	out	foetus	instruction	as	the	earliest	possible	opportunity	to	mould	the	moral	ibre	of	the	crown	prince.	This	
emphasis on the crown prince is part of his political strategy and is related to the need 
for stability and the avoidance of political and social disasters. On the analysis of the 
idea of taijiao	in	Jia	Yi,	see	Sabattini	2009.
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characterised by its display of epideictic discourse 25 and whose purpose was to 
advise, or on his discursive genres such as lun (discourse) chapters. Nevertheless, in	Jia	Yi	the	art	of	persuasion	addresses	political	and	psychological	problems	
not merely through this prose-poetry genre or his lun, but it is intrinsically part	of	his	phraseology.	Giving	emotive	expression	to	words	is	part	of	Jia	Yi’s	
declamatory style. His discourse is redolent of that canonical literature, full of 
allusions and archaism, which would be developed in later political literature. His	prose	adopts	an	impersonal	style,	whose	goal	is	critique	and	correction.Another	cardinal	principle	of	Jia	Yi’s	political	technique	is	the	emphasis	on	selecting	good	oficials	and	assistants	for	the	state	to	be	ordered	and	secured.	The	
emperor’s responsibilities include precisely this task of attracting and promoting competent	aides	and	oficials	in	order	to	gain	their	loyalty:	loyal	oficials	and	
assistants may be able to dominate and control the multitude. The idea that 
capable and virtuous people should be employed rather than the ruler’s relatives, irst	appears	in	the	political	discussion	of	the	Springs	and	Autumns	(770-453	BCE) period; it is fully developed during the Warring States period and inherited by	the	early	Han.	During	the	Warring	States,	the	“elevating	the	worthy”	(shang 
xian) debate was linked to the social mobility that led to the end of the pedigree-
based social order and to a profound change in the ruling elite. 26 The state of Qin	contributed	to	social	mobility	by	introducing	new	principles	of	promotion	
based on military merits and high tax yields.	27 This social mobility reached its peak	with	the	irst	rebellion	against	the	Qin	led	by	the	farmhand	Chen	She	(d.	
208 BCE)	and	the	later	accession	to	the	throne	of	Liu	Bang	(alias	Gaozu,	r.	
202-195 BCE),	the	irst	Han	emperor,	who	was	born	in	humble	circumstances	
but nevertheless successfully ascended the throne. Not long after, during the 
early decades of the Han dynasty, the idea of “elevating the worthy” still was a	key	problem:	the	court	was	dominated	by	those	who	had	risen	to	inluence	
25.	 See	Knechtges	1976.	The	fu was the dominant poetic genre during the Han dynasty 
and it is variously translated “rhyme-prose,” “rhapsody,” “verse-essay,” “prose-poetry.” It	originated	from	a	type	of	chanting	used	by	oficials	of	the	Zhou	dynasty	to	present	
political plans at court; at the end of the Warring States period it evolved into a genre. 
The earliest received fu is the “Fu Chapter” of the Xunzi. Starting from the Han dynasty, 
the purpose of the fu	was	to	present	“criticism.”	According	to	Lewis,	rhapsody	was	an	example	of	attaining	mastery	through	written	language.	See	Lewis	1999:	317-332.
26.	 The	idea	of	promoting	upright	persons,	which	is	irst	discussed	by	Confucius	and	his	disciples,	is	beneicial	for	the	upward	mobility	of	the	shi (literati, political persuaders). 
It is the “Elevating the Worthy” chapter of the Mozi,	another	major	text	from	the	Springs	and	Autumns	period,	that	proposes	a	list	of	measures	for	attracting	and	promoting	the	
worthy and good shi. This idea, and its internalisation, marked the end of the pedigree-
based social order. On the rise of the shi,	see	Pines	2009:	115-135.27.	 Pines	2009:	123.
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through military merits and not intellectual ones 28:	Liu	Bang	ascended	the	throne	
after a civil war and needed a dependable political environment, so he awarded his	followers	with	territories,	and	during	his	rule	iefs	were	given	to	collateral	relatives.	The	end	result	was	that	for	the	irst	decades,	 the	Han	empire	was	
not directly administered by the central government. Economic and political problems	arising	from	this	administrative	and	political	situation	led	Jia	Yi	to	recommend	abolition	of	the	iefs 29:	political	power	had	to	be	centralised	in	
order to be controlled.
The early Han court milieu was characterised not only by the struggle of 
scholars wishing to improve their position within the new order, but also by 
the tension between scholars and leading military veterans who supported the ascension	of	Liu	Bang.	During	the	time	of	Jia	Yi,	the	tension	increased:	Emperor	
Wen ascended the throne thanks to a sort of coup d’État	led	by	Liu	Bang’s	old	
retainers. 30 These military followers, who led the overthrow of the Empress Lü’s	clan 31	and	placed	Emperor	Wen	on	the	throne,	were	still	very	inluential.	Jia	Yi	was	part	of	this	scenario	and	aimed	to	persuade	the	Emperor	to	attract	and	promote	competent	ministers.	Although	in	previous	times	scholars	were	
more generally opposed to hereditary transmission in the name of “elevating the	worthy,”	I	believe	that	Jia	Yi	merged	the	two:	in	order	to	achieve	political	
stability, the Empire needed to make clear rules both on succession to the throne 
and on the selection of ministers and aides. Establishing the crown prince early, 32 
on one hand, could prevent another coup d’État and maintain the control of 
succession; on the other, counsellors had to be selected because they were 
worthy and loyal, 33 and had to take part in the heir’s education. I think that Jia	Yi’s	idea	comes	from	necessity—and	a	career	objective—not	only	from	
paternalistic observation.Jia	Yi’s	political	phraseology	is	strongly	inluenced	by	this	court	conlict:	he	
uses the expression “people as root” in a negative and cynical manner, alerting 
the emperor to the possible danger posed by the people—the grassroots of the 
28.	 Qian	Mu	1978:	174-175.
29. The economic reason was that in the areas controlled by the court, much of the tax income went	to	holders	of	iefs.	Both	Jia	Yi	and	Chao	Cuo	(d.	154	BCE) note this problem. On this	topic	see	Lewis	1999:	340-342.	For	Chao	Cuo	biography,	see	Shiji 101; Hanshu 
49.
30. For Wendi’s biography, see Shiji 10. On the “coup d’État,” see Shiji	9:	399-411.
31.	 On	the	construction	of	the	stereotype	of	Empress	Lü	as	a	cruel	usurper,	see	Sabattini	in	press.	On	Empress	Lü,	see	also	van	Ess	2006	and	Schaab-Hanke 1999.
32. Shiji	10:	419.
33. The idea of foetus education developed in the New Writings deals with this matter. See 
Sabattini 2009.
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empire—and suggests controlling the masses. Moreover, I believe that the 
rhetorical formula of min ben, which is constantly reiterated in the text, is used 
to contrast people to scholars and convince the Emperor to “elevate the worthy” 
from a civil and intellectual point of view. The need to clarify the rules of court competition	based	on	civil	meritocracy	is	urgent:	 the	government	cannot	be	inluenced	by	its	grassroots,	rather	it	has	to	control	them	in	order	to	prevent	
any revolts.
In the “Great	Command,	Part	I” and	“Great	Command,	Part	II,” the idea of 
the “people as root” is based on the debates of good government and military success.	The	overthrow	of	the	Qin	was	still	a	vivid	memory	and	for	this	reason	Jia	Yi	focuses	on	the	vital	inluence	the	people	have	in	determining	stability	or	instability	of	the	ruler,	also	in	battle.	Indeed,	according	to	Jia	Yi,	the	role	of	the	
people and their motivation in times of war are both fundamental in ensuring a	stable	position	for	the	ruler.	The	term	“people”	for	Jia	Yi	becomes	part	of	political	phraseology	and	it	carries	a	distinctly	political	connotation.	Jia	Yi	offers	another	interpretation	of	the	“people”: they are an unstable mass to be 
controlled and kept in order.
In contrast with previous texts underlining the idea of “cherishing the people” 
(ai min)	and	“beneiting	the	people”	(li min), the New Writings stress the danger which	the	people	themselves	represent:	the	people	are	many	while	the	ruler	is	
one man. 34	The	formula	“people	as	root”	becomes	a	persuasive	deinition	used	by	Jia	Yi	with	the	purpose	of	changing	the	direction	of	the	emperor’s	interest	
from the people-oriented policy to the ruler-oriented one. Therefore, in the New 
Writings the term “people” addresses emotive impact.
Domesticating the people
According	to	the	traditional	reading	of	the	“people	as	root”	concept,	 the	key	to	genuine	leadership	is	the	manifestation	of	virtues	that	beneit	the	people.	
The origins of the notion of good government deriving from “people as root,” normally	irst	associated	with	the	Commentary of Zuo, 35 is usually related to the	philosophy	of	Confucius	(Kongzi,	551-479	BCE)	and	Mengzi.	The	idea	of	
the people as the root, or foundation, of political stability is also related to the 
concept of the Mandate of Heaven (tian ming), an idea probably generated in Zhou	times	to	justify	their	overthrow	of	the	Shang,	but	later	acritically	applied	
to any historical period in China. Nevertheless, it cannot be overlooked that the	idea	that	popular	rebellion	is	justiied	in	terms	of	Heaven’s	Mandate	is	of	
34.	 This	concern	is	also	part	of	Han	Feizi’s	relection.	See	Han	Feizi	16.5a.	Cf.	Creel	1974.
35.	 Liu	Jiahe	1995	and	Zheng	Junhua	1983.
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marginal	relevance	during	the	Qin	and	early	Han	period. 36	Moreover,	Jia	Yi	clearly	states	that	the	fall	of	the	reign	is	the	consequence	of	the	ruler’s	faults	
and does not depend on Heaven’s Writ.
Contrary to the common interpretation of the “people as root,” in Envisioning 
Eternal Empire. Chinese Political Thought of the Warring States Era,	Yuri	Pines	
shows that the idea of the people as the most important component of the polity is	not	exclusive	to	Mengzi,	but	relects	a	common	thread	found	throughout	
Zhou-period thinkers.	37	Pines	writes	that	the	belief	in	the	exceptional	political	
importance of “the people” is traceable to the earliest layers of the Chinese 
political tradition. 38 To guarantee political and social stability, the ruler has to 
protect the people (bao min)	and	beneit	them,	which	amounts	to	cherishing	
the root of the state.Jia	Yi	was	probably	the	irst	to	develop	the	Chinese	expression	min ben in 
a systematic manner in his New Writings, where the notion of the “people as root”	is	clearly	developed	in	the	chapters	“Great	Command,	Part	I”	and	“Great	Command,	Part	II.”	Scholarly	interpretation	generally	considers	the	notion	developed	in	this	 text	 in	the	light	of	Mengzi’s	 thought.	For	instance,	Wang	Xingguo	links	Jia	Yi’s	idea	of	min ben	to	Mengzi’s	notion	of	“government	by	
benevolence” (ren zheng). 39	From	a	irst	reading	of	the	New Writings, we might catch	a	glimpse	of	this	connection:
Among	virtues,	nothing	is	higher	than	universally	cherishing	the	people,	and	in	policy	nothing	is	higher	than	universally	beneiting	the	people.	Therefore,	in	policy	nothing	
is more important than truthfulness, and in governing nothing is more important 
than benevolence. 40
However,	when	we	pick	over	Jia	Yi’s	thought,	this	statement	responds	more	to	a	
rhetorical use of social virtue rather than to a real people-oriented idea. Virtues become	techniques	for	governing	the	masses,	because	they	are	acceptable	moral	
precepts which function as means of persuasion. This approach to virtues is 
36.	 See	Pines	2009:	217.	See	also	Loewe	1994:	85-111.37.	 Pines	2009:	187-197.	Cf.	Ames	1994:	154-164.
38.	 Pines	2009:	189.
39.	 Wang	Xingguo	1992:	141-143.	See	also	Cai	Tingji	1984:	141-143.	The	expression	ren 
zheng	inds	ten	matches	in	the	entire	Mengzi and it is well developed. On the contrary, it 
never occurs in the New Writings.	As	for	the	term	min (people) in the Mengzi,	Gassman	
considers that the translation “people,” while it might work for the Han period, is 
too vague and inaccurate for the Eastern Zhou period. In the kinship-based social organization,	min could not designate the ruling clan but only other clans and their 
members.
40. Jiazi,	“Talks	on	Political	Reforms,	Part	I”	(“Xiu	zheng	yu	shang	修政語к”):	1044.
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much	closer	to	statesmen	like	Shang	Yang	and	Han	Feizi	than	to	classicists	like	Mengzi.	For	instance,	Han	Feizi,	who	follows	Shang	Yang,	states	that	“Proit	is	
what [the sage] uses for winning over the people.” 41Even	so,	according	to	Wang	Xingguo’s	analysis	of	Jia	Yi’s	min ben, the 
power of the people stems from their weight of numbers and position as the 
basis of material production. 42	Nevertheless,	Jia	Yi	never	argues	that	the	ruler’s	
authority comes from the people. 43 To rule with benevolence is a tool used by 
the ruler in order to prevent uprisings from the base of the state. On the contrary, according	to	Mengzi,	“benevolence	is	the	distinguished	characteristic	of	man”	
(ren ye zhe ren ye) 44 and practice of a benevolent government is the key to making	people	happy:
When the ruler practices a benevolent government, the people will feel related to 
their superiors and will die for their leaders. 45
Mengzi’s	notion	of	“ruling	by	benevolence”	is	expressed	throughout	his	text.	
Moreover he says that “the people are most important; the altars of soil and 
grain come next; the ruler is the least,” 46 meaning that while the people will 
exist eternally, the ruler is replaceable. For this reason, the ruler needs to win 
the people’s support in order to keep his position stable. How to gain the trust of	the	people?	Mengzi	is	very	clear	and	claims	that	the	ruler	has	to	“attain	the	people’s	heart”:
Jie and Zhou [xin] lost the throne through losing the people. To lose the people means to	lose	their	hearts.	There	is	a	way	to	attain	the	throne:	if	you	attain	the	people,	you	attain	the	throne.	There	is	a	way	to	attain	the	people:	if	you	attain	their	hearts,	you	attain	the	people.	There	is	a	way	to	attain	the	people’s	hearts:	collect	for	them	what	
they desire and do not do what they despise. The people turn to benevolence as water lows	downwards	or	as	animals	head	for	the	wilds.	47
According	to	Mengzi,	the	way	to	keep	the	throne	safe	is	to	“attain	the	people’s	heart”:	if	the	ruler	cherishes	the	people	and	satisies	their	desires,	there	is	no	way	
the people will be disloyal to him. If they are loyal, the ruler can use them. In Mengzi’s	view,	being	benevolent	to	the	people	is	the	key	to	keeping	the	political	
41. 夫利者所以得民也。 Han Feizi,	“Dishonest	Oficials”	(“Gui	shi	詭使”).
42.	 Wang	Xingguo	1992:	124-126.	Cf.	Sanft	2005a:	35.
43.	 Sanft	2005a:	36.
44. 仁也者人也。Mengzi	7B.
45. Mengzi	1B.
46. 民為貴，社稷次之，君為輕。Mengzi	7B.47. Mengzi	4A.
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power. 48	Mengzi	persuades	his	audience	to	respect	the	people’s	needs	in	order	to	
keep them loyal. In his political phraseology, the relationship between the ruler 
and the people is encouraging and positive. Nevertheless, the idea of “cherishing 
the people” and recognising their merits rather than using punishments to keep 
the position of the ruler stable is not a prerogative of Confucius 49	or	Mengzi.	Also	Mozi	(ca	460−390	BCE) is clearly against the pedigree-based order, and in his writings	urges	for	meritocratic	principles	for	choosing	the	leaders.	Mozi	shares	the	idea	both	of	“cherishing	the	people”	and	the	one	of	the	ruler’s	inluence	over	them.	In	Mozi’s	political	theory,	the	idea	of	“inclusive	care”	(jian ai), 50 
usually opposed to the “Confucian” view of hierarchical love that begins with one’s	relatives,	is	the	basis	of	good	government.	Disorder	in	society	is	caused	by	
egoism; only caring for each other can recover the state. To care for others is thus 
the cure, and the good ruler, who is benevolent and right, has to set the example.The	ideas	of	“cherishing	the	people”	and	“beneiting	the	people”	are	also	
found in the New Writings,	but	they	become	a	technique	the	emperor	can	use	to	motivate	the	people	and	then	govern	them.	Jia	Yi’s	idea	of	the	“people” 51 is not a	positive	one:	the	people	are	the	“unstable”	foundations	of	the	state. 52 In his 
political thought, the theme of giving importance to the welfare of the people has	a	political	motivation:	manipulating	the	human	propensity	for	self-interest. 53 Let	us	consider	how	Jia	Yi	describes	the	people:
“People”	as	a	term	means	“blur.”	“Seed”	as	a	term	means	“blind.”	[…]	Therefore	
I say that “people are seeds.” The meaning immediately follows from the name. People	have	talents	making	them	either	competent	or	inept.	Both	the	competent	and	
the inept are present among them. Thus, you get competent people among them, but	the	inept	are	[also]	hidden	among	them.	The	ability	to	perform	a	job	will	be	
48. Mengzi	7A.
49.	 According	to	Lunyu	2.3.	Confucius	said:	“If	the	people	are	led	by	laws,	and	the	order	
sought is given to them by punishments, they will try to avoid the punishment, and 
have no sense of shame. If they are led by moral virtue, and the order sought is given 
to them by the rules of propriety, they will have the sense of shame, and moreover will 
become good.” 子曰˖ǋ道之以政，齊之以刑，民免而無恥˗道之以德，齊之以
禮，有恥且格。ǌ
50. Jian ai is variously translated as “universal love,” “impartial caring,” “inclusive care.” On	this	topic,	see	Defoort	2007.
51. In early Han dynasty, the “people” (min)	generally	identiied	four	groups:	scholars,	farmers,	artisans	and	merchants.	See	Ch’ü	T’ung-tsu	1972:	101.	Jia	Yi	refers	to	the	
“people” designating those commoners who were not scholars. This is shown by many instances	where	Jia	Yi	refers	to	the	shi min	(scholars	and	people).	See	also	Sanft	2005a:	
29.
52.	 See	Sanft	2005a:	28-91.
53.	 This	idea	is	similar	to	the	thought	of	Shang	Yang	and	Han	Feizi.
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assessed by the people, and loyal ministers will be exemplary to them. The people 
are an accumulation of foolishness. So, although the people are foolish, wise rulers select	oficials	among	them,	and	they	necessarily	make	the	people	follow	them. 54
By	redeining	the	crucial	term	“people,”	Jia	Yi	warns	the	emperor	to	beware	of	
the masses. The importance of fear as a political emotion is clearly expressed in	his	 thinking:	“the	people	are	a	blur”	and	 they	are	an	“accumulation	of	
foolishness.” 55	Jia	Yi	does	not	use	positive	terms	to	describe	the	“people”:	they	
are a sort of shapeless entity that comprises both the wise and the wicked. His 
purpose in referring to the people in these negative terms is to alert the emperor to	the	instability	of	the	“people”:	they	are	unworthy	and	unreliable,	and	must	be	
ordered and controlled. The emotive stress on fear reiterated in these paragraphs 
aims at warning the audience about the potential danger the people represent. Jia	Yi’s	language	of	wariness	and	fear,	which	aims	to	stress	the	ruler’s	political	responsibilities,	is	much	closer	to	Han	Feizi’s	and	other	statesmen	rather	than	“Confucian”	benevolence.	According	to	Jia	Yi,	people	are	like	dogs:	“cherishing	
the people” means taming them.
Therefore I say that punishments cannot be a means of endearing the people and 
indifference cannot be a means of courting good advisers. For this reason, attempting 
to endear the people by means of punishments is like trying to domesticate a dog by	means	of	a	whip:	even	after	a	long	time,	you	will	not	get	close	to	it.	Attempting	
to court good advisers by means of indifference is like attracting a bird by means of	a	bow:	even	after	a	long	time,	you	will	not	catch	it.	As	for	advisers,	if	the	[ruler]	does	not	respect	them,	then	he	will	not	attract	them	to	him.	As	for	the	people,	if	the	
[ruler] does not cherish them, then they will not honour him. Thus it is only with 
respect and deference, loyalty and trustworthiness that you can obtain good advisors 
and expect the people to honour you. This has not changed from ancient times to the 
present. Just as swamps have water, 56	states	cannot	be	without	soldiers.	But	if	the	
ruler is unskilled in seeking soldiers, there is no way that soldiers can be obtained. If oficials	have	no	ability	to	control	the	people,	there	is	no	way	that	the	people	can	be	controlled.	When	the	ruler	is	wise,	oficials	are	talented;	when	oficials	are	talented,	
people are controlled.	57
In	the	passage	quoted	above,	using	punishment	to	endear	the	people	is	compared	to	 inability	 in	inding	 retainers. 58	The	people	 are	 like	dogs:	 they	must	be	domesticated.	Punishing	the	people	is	like	taking	a	whip	to	a	dog.	This	is	not	
54. Jiazi,	“Great	Command,	Part	II”:	1011-1013.
55. Jiazi,	“Great	Command,	Part	II”:	1011.
56. Emending shui 水 for mu 木. See Jiazi:	1005	(fn:	5).57. Jiazi,	“Great	Command,	Part	II”:	1003.
58.	 On	Jia	Yi	and	punishments,	see	Sanft	2005b;	Sanft	2005c.
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the right way to control them, because sooner or later they will rebel against it. 
In order to control the masses, which are an accumulation of foolishness, the emperor	has	to	cherish	them	while	oficials	have	to	control	them.	Similarly,	
indifference towards good retainers is not the proper way to keep them loyal. 59The	Han	were	born	from	the	remains	of	the	Qin	dynasty	whose	debacle	was	brought	about	by	the	rebellion	of	the	commoners,	and	Jia	Yi	wants	to	prevent	such	situations	and	his	ideas	about	people	are	close	to	Xunzi’s.	The	chapter	“On	the	Regulations	of	a	King”	(Wang zhi) of the Xunzi contains the well-known observation:
If a horse is frightened by the carriage, then the superior man cannot ride safely; if 
the common people are frightened by the government, then the superior man cannot 
safely occupy his ruling position. If the horse is frightened of the carriage, the best thing	to	do	is	to	quiet	it;	if	the	common	people	are	frightened	of	the	government,	the	
best thing to do is to treat them with generosity. Select men who are worthy and good for	government	ofice,	promote	those	who	are	kind	and	respectful,	encourage	ilial	
piety and fraternity, look after orphans and widows and assist the poor, and then the 
common people will feel safe, then the superior man may safely occupy his position [as	ruler].	The	tradition	says:	“The	lord	is	the	boat;	the	commoners	are	the	water.	
Water supports the boat and water overturns the boat.” This explains my meaning. 
Therefore, if one who rules over people desires stability, there is no alternative to 
governing wisely and cherishing the people. 60
According	to	Xunzi,	“cherishing	the	people”	is	an	instrument	for	government,	not	its	purpose.	Quoting	a	traditional	saying,	Xunzi	is	keen	to	highlight	that	the	power	of	the	people	can	overthrow	the	ruler:	in	terms	of	power	given	by	numbers,	it	is	an	unequal	match.	Moreover,	the	use	of	the	term	“commoners”	
(shu) emphasises the sheer mass of ordinary people compared with the single 
59.	 In	this	regard,	several	passages	of	Jia	Yi’s	Xin shu	take	as	their	example	Yu	Rang,	who	sought	revenge	against	Xiangzi,	the	killer	of	his	sovereign	Zhi	Bo.	Yu	Rang	becomes	the	model	of	the	loyal	retainer:	he	served	other	rulers	irst,	but	his	talent	and	loyalty	were	not	recognised.	In	contrast,	Zhi	Bo	displayed	great	respect	and	support	for	him.	
In the Xin shu,	Yu	Rang	is	mentioned	in	the	following	chapters:	“Jie	ji” 階級	(“Levels	
and grades”), “Huai nan” 淮難	(“Huai	is	dificult”),	“Yu	cheng” 諭誠 (“Explaining earnest”).	Yu	Rang	is	a	well-known	example	in	Chinese	texts.	His	story	is	mentioned	
in the Intrigues of the Warring States (Zhanguo ce 戰國策), Han Feizi, Record of the 
Grand Historian, The Springs and Autumns of Mr Lü (Lüshi chunqiu 呂氏春秋), The 
Garden of Persuasion (Shui yuan 說苑), The Master of Huainan (Huainanzi 淮南子), 
The Balanced Inquiries (Lun heng 論衡). On the story of getting shi (retainers), see Pines	2002:	35-74.
60. Xunzi	9:	152-153.	The	translation	is	by	Watson	and	Sato,	with	my	corrections.	See	Watson	1963:	36-37;	Sato	2003:	261-262.
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sovereign. The might of many is stronger than the resolve of few. This hardly 
seems a vision of ungrudging co-operation and appears rather to strike a note of	warning.	While	on	one	hand	Xunzi	agrees	with	Mengzi	on	governing	by	
cherishing and caring for the people, on the other he reveals mainly the potential 
danger posed by people. Enriching the people and governing them by exercising a	benevolent	policy	is	the	key	to	keeping	power:
If	a	ruler	reduces	land	taxes	on	ields	for	both	agricultural	products	and	natural	
resources, establishes a standardised tariff to be imposed on those crossing the border 
and selling commodities in the market places, reduces the number of merchants and traders,	refrains	from	moving	his	subjects	to	[heavy	construction	works]	and	from	
robbing the peasants of agricultural labour in their busy seasons, his country will 
become rich. This may indeed be called “enriching the people through the exercising 
of a policy.” 61
Xunzi’s	argumentation	warns	the	ruler	of	the	danger	of	the	people’s	discontent:	
rebellion and destruction can be the natural response to a government based on	tyranny.	Xunzi’s	relection	on	the	potential	danger	of	a	massive	number	of	people	is	prophetic	of	the	rebellions	that	led	to	the	downfall	of	the	Qin	dynasty.	A	few	years	later,	Jia	Yi	recognises	the	power	of	the	people	and	shares	not	only	Xunzi’s	insight,	but	also	the	idea	of	Han	Feizi,	old	student	of	Xunzi,	of	using	the	people	for	the	ruler’s	interests.	I	think	that	the	sentiments	of	Jia	Yi	cannot	be	
considered pro-people. His rhetoric and political phraseology apparently belong 
to the discussion of people-oriented thought and share the concern of mass 
poverty. However, his political thought is more ruler-oriented. “Cherishing the people”	is	an	instrument	in	the	hands	of	the	ruler.	Jia	Yi	uses	moral	principles	
for manipulating the natural human devotion to self-interest in referring to the 
idea of protecting and loving the people from a “Confucian-Mohist” point of 
view. This opportunistic resort to moral values suggests the “emotive force” of	the	people-oriented	discourse.	In	this	sense,	we	can	see	injections	of	the	thinking	of	Shang	Yang:	the	people	need	to	be	ruled	in	order	to	avoid	anarchy	
and violence. Harsh laws are necessary to attain political and social stability. 62 Shang	Yang	says	that	if	the	basis	is	not	solid,	people	are	like	beasts	and	the	
basis of the people is the law. 63	Similarly,	Jia	Yi	states	that:	“benevolence,	duty,	affection,	and	magnanimity	are	the	blades	of	the	lord	of	men.	Power,	force,	law,	
61. Xunzi	10:	179.	The	translation	is	by	Watson	and	Sato,	with	my	own	minor	corrections.	Watson	1963:	38;	Sato	2003:	264.
62.	 On	Shang	Yang’s	people-oriented	inluence,	see	Pines	2009:	201-203.
63. 本нี，則民如飛鳥走獸 (...) 民本，法也。Shang jun shu (The Book of Lord Shang), “Policies”	(“Hua	ce”	畫策).
Elisa Sabattini
182
and	regulations	are	the	adze	and	axe	of	the	lord	of	men.” 64 “Confucian” virtues are	just	techniques	to	maintain	power	not	only	for	the	emperor,	but	indirectly	
also for those scholars who are employed at court. Understanding the needs of 
the people is a mere political instrument.
The people as root
According	to	Jia	Yi,	although	the	people	are	a	“blur,” 65 there are some who 
are wise. The task of the enlightened ruler is to select those who are wise and promote	them	as	oficials	and	ministers	so	they	act	as	intermediaries	between	
the people and the emperor. To have political support, the emperor should select 
those who are praised by the people so even the incompetents will trust them, because	they	feel	them	to	be	close.	The	idea	to	search	for	oficials	among	the	
people and promote them is not novel in Chinese political thought and it is not peculiar	of	classicists:	on	the	contrary	many	thinkers	from	the	Warring	States	period	share	the	awareness	of	inding	competent	assistants.According	to	Jia	Yi,	the	“people”	are	a	shapeless	entity,	nevertheless	oficials	
should be selected according to the people’s wishes in order to govern them. This	idea	is	close	to	the	one	of	“utilize	the	masses”	(yong zhong), which allows 
the ruler to marshal the physical and intellectual resource of the state in order to maintain	stability.	As	a	result	of	doing	so,	the	ruler	acquires	power	and	vision,	
essential for leading the country.
Extremely	vile	though	the	people	are,	yet	you	have	to	allow	them	to	choose	oficials	
from amongst themselves, and they will certainly choose those whom they love. 
Therefore, if ten people cherish and hold allegiance to [someone], then he is the oficial	for	those	ten	people.	If	one	hundred	people	cherish	and	hold	allegiance	to	[someone],	then	he	is	the	oficial	for	one	hundred	people.	If	a	thousand	people	cherish	and	hold	allegiance	to	[someone],	then	he	is	the	oficial	for	a	thousand	people.	If	ten	thousand	cherish	and	hold	allegiance	to	[someone],	then	he	is	the	oficial	for	ten	thousand.	Then	the	oficials	for	ten	thousand	select	high	ministers	from	their	
number. 66
Jia	Yi	explains	that	the	people,	with	all	their	limitations,	are	many	in	number	and	the	emperor	has	no	choice	but	to	choose	his	oficials	from	among	them,	
64. 仁義恩厚者，此人主之芒刃也。權勢法制，此人主之斤斧也。 Jiazi, “On the Faults of	Qin”	(“Guo	Qin	lun”	過秦論):	213-214.	On	this	paragraph	see	also	Sanft	2005a:	36-37.
65. Jiazi,	“Great	Command,	Part	II”:	1011.
66. Jiazi,	“Great	Command,	Part	II”:	1013.	This	text	is	reproduced	almost	verbatim in the 
forged Yuzi 鬻子.
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selecting those who are put forward by the people themselves. The argument 
remains within the discourse of grasping the people’s sentiments and not of activism	from	below.	Jia	Yi	persuades	the	audience	to	listen	to	the	people	and	
not to dissatisfy them in order to receive their loyalty as a response. He does 
not promulgate nor hope for activism from below, but expresses the importance of	selecting	oficials	loved	by	the	people	to	make	them	feel	secure	and,	in	turn,	
control them. The people are numerous and the emperor’s task is to make them 
feel secure, thus there is clearly recognition of the potential of the masses to 
subvert the empire. The people do not have political authority, but they are far 
more numerous than the ruler’s aides and thus more effective in case of rebellion. 
Using the many, however is a great treasure for the ruler. Since the stability of 
the state is ultimately dependent upon the will of the people, the good ruler has 
to win over the people and rely upon their support.	67In	the	“Great	Command,	Part	I,”	Jia	Yi	reiterates	that	in	government	the	people	are	the	root	of	everything:
I heard that in political affairs the people are the root of everything. The state views them	as	a	root;	the	ruler	views	them	as	a	root;	oficials	view	them	as	a	root.	For	this	
reason, the state takes the people as the [root] of being secure or endangered; the ruler	takes	the	people	as	[the	root]	of	awe	or	humiliation;	oficials	takes	the	people	
as [the root] of being noble or base. This is what is meant by “The people are the 
root of everything.”
I heard that in political affairs, there is no case where the people do not function as 
the determinant. The state views them as the determinant; the ruler views them as the determinant;	the	oficials	view	them	as	the	determinant.	For	this	reason,	the	state’s	
preservation or ruin depends on the people; the ruler’s blindness or clear-sightedness depend	on	the	people;	the	oficials’worthiness	or	ineptitude	depend	on	the	people.	
This is what is meant by “There is no case where the people are not the determinant.”
I heard that in political affairs, there is no case where the people do not function as the 
achievement. Similarly, the state views the people as the achievement; the ruler views the	people	as	the	achievement;	the	oficials	view	the	people	as	the	achievement.	The	
state’s prosperity or destruction depends on the people; ruler’s strength or weakness depends	on	the	people;	oficials’ability	or	the	lack	thereof	depend	on	the	people.	
This is what is meant by “There is no case where the people do not function as the 
achievement.”
I heard that in political affairs, there is no case where the people do not function as 
the strength. Thus, the state views [the people] as the strength; the ruler views the people	as	the	strength;	the	oficials	view	the	people	as	the	strength.	For	this	reason,	
67. This approach is very similar with the one of the Spring and Autumn of Mr Lü, see for 
instance 4/9b. Cf.	Ames	1994:	142-143.
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victory in a battle depends on the people’s desire for the victory. The success of the 
attack depends on the people’s desire for success. The ruler’s safety depends on 
the people’s desire for his safety. If this is the case, when you lead the people in a 
defensive action, but the people do not wish to defend, then nobody will be able to 
use [them] in the defence. Similarly, if you lead the people in an attack, but this is not 
the people’s wish, then nobody will be able to use [them] in the attack. Therefore, if 
you lead the people in battle, but the people do not intend to succeed, then nobody 
will be able to use [them] for the victory. 68
In	this	long	passage	quoted	above,	Jia	Yi	persuades	the	audience	of	the	importance	of	the	people’s	will.	By	repetition	of	terms,	symmetrical	lines	and	deinition,	Jia	Yi	aims	to	release	the	emotional	force	of	words.	In	Jia	Yi’s	rhetorical	sequence,	the	justiication	for	the	argument	precedes	it:	people	are	described	in	terms	of	
root (ben), determinant (ming), achievement (gong), and strength (li).	Deinitions	
occur throughout the passage and the last instance constitutes the conclusion 69; 
the text starts from the people as “root” and ends with the people as “strength.” The	inal	emphasis	on	strength	focuses	on	the	vital	role	of	the	people	during	
a war. The success of the battle, the safety of ruler and state, all hinge on the people’s	motivation.	Jia	Yi	persuades	the	emperor	of	the	importance	of	the	
people’s role with a series of symmetrical sentences focused on the origins of the 
people’s strength. The outcome if the people show determination in defence of 
their sovereign and the state is described a step at a time. This is the full meaning 
of the people as the root, the determinant, the achievement, and the strength of the	state,	the	ruler	and	his	oficials.	There	is	no	way	to	succeed	in	war	unless	the	
people share in the effort. The people are the root of the state because success in	war	and	the	safety	of	the	ruler	depend	on	them:	the	people’s	motivation	is	crucial.	Political	power	and	stability	are	dependent	upon	the	multitude.
The ambivalence represented by the people mitigates and combines the 
idea of the people as a danger—coming from political ideas of statesmen like Han	Feizi—with	that	of	the	people	as	foundation	of	the	state—inherited	from	classicists	 like	Mengzi.	Again,	Jia	Yi	underlines	 that	 the	people	have	to	be	
motivated to defend the country, only then the ruler will retain power – an apt 
precept considering that the Han dynasty was freshly established and owed its 
position to military victory.	70 The political landscape had changed and power 
was centred on the ruler. The people’s role in support of this central authority 
68. Jiazi,	“Great	Command,	Part	II”:	981-983.
69.	 On	the	central	position	of	redeinitions,	especially	in	The Pheasant Cap Master, see Defoort	1997:	145-147.70.	 See	also	Sanft	2006:	36.
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and	the	bond	they	felt	with	the	emperor	were	fundamental.	Jia	Yi	concludes	this	argument	as	follows:
Therefore, when people support their superiors, [in battle] they willingly move closer	to	the	enemy	and	advance	without	linching;	the	enemy	will	certainly	fear	
[them] and from this point onward the battle will be won. For this reason, calamity 
and good fortune [in war] do not depend on Heaven; they necessarily depend on 
the soldiers and the people. Take heed, take heed! The people’s will is crucial. Take 
heed, take heed!	71
In	this	paragraph,	Jia	Yi	distances	himself	from	the	concept	of	Heaven’s	Mandate:	
success or defeat in battle do not hang on Heaven’s blessing or curse, but on the	people	themselves.	According	to	Jia	Yi,	 the	ruler	himself	 is	responsible	
for the people’s lack of motivation. It is vital for him to have the right attitude towards	the	people:
If your virtuous conduct is excellent, you will have good fortune; if your conduct 
is morally bad, you will have misfortune. Therefore, it is not thanks to merits from 
Heaven that one receives good fortune; likewise, those who suffer calamities should not	blame	Heaven.	Good	fortune	and	misfortune	depend	on	one’s	own	actions.	Knowing	virtuous	conduct	but	not	following	it	is	“unwise.”	You	will	certainly	court	
natural disaster, if you indulge in morally bad conduct and do not change it. Heaven’s 
blessings are constant and are bestowed on people who are virtuous; Heaven’s 
calamities are constant and are bestowed on those who rob the people of their seasons. 
Therefore, however base these people may be, they cannot be disregarded; however stupid	these	people	may	be,	they	cannot	be	cheated.	For	this	reason,	from	antiquity	
to the present, [in battle] the one who becomes a mortal enemy of the people, sooner 
or later the people will surely overcome him.	72
Jia	Yi	admonishes	 the	emperor	 saying	 that	 fortune	and	misfortune	do	not	
come from heaven, but they are the natural response to good and bad conduct respectively.	Regardless	how	dull-witted	they	are,	the	people	respond	to	their	sovereign’s	good	or	bad	conduct.	If	the	state	enjoys	good	fortune,	the	people	are	
happy; on the other hand, when misfortune strikes, the masses may rebel and in	such	cases	they	will	always	be	victorious.	Again,	that	is	to	say,	in	beneiting	his	people	the	ruler	is	beneiting	himself.	This	idea	is	not	novel,	however	Jia	Yi	
emphasises the unreliability of the people in order to insist on the importance 
of fear as a political emotion. The power of the people in terms of strength is a 
political emotion that aims at convincing the emperor to motivate and to fear the masses	and	attain	their	loyalty.	From	this	point	of	view,	the	people	have	power:
71. Jiazi,	“Great	Command,	Part	I”:	982-984.72. Jiazi,	“Great	Command,	Part	I”:	984-987.
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Thus the people are plenty in strength and should not be resisted.	73
[…]When	the	ruler	is	virtuous,	the	oficials	will	also	certainly	be	virtuous.	When	oficials	
are virtuous, the people will also certainly be virtuous. For the same reason, it is the fault	of	the	oficials	when	people	are	morally	bad;	and	it	is	the	ruler’s	weakness	that	causes	oficials	to	be	immoral.	Take	heed,	take	heed!
[…]When	the	ruler	is	morally	good	in	this	respect,	then	the	people	have	no	dificulty	in	being	morally	good,	they	are	just	like	the	shape	and	the	image	of	his	shadow.	If	the	
ruler is morally bad with the people, he simply destroys the agreement. If the people are	all	bad	with	him,	they	are	just	like	the	sound	of	his	echoes.	74
The	masses	respond	like	echoes	to	the	ruler’s	decisions	and	behaviour:	if	they	do	not	respect	the	moral	laws,	one	has	only	to	check	the	ruler’s	attitude.	Again	the	rhetorical	techniques	of	repetition	and	luid	deinition	recur	to	guide	the	reader	to	the	inal	step	in	the	reasoning:	the	ruler’s	moral	conduct	is	the	model	for	his	people.	This	reiteration	on	moral	values	is	an	opportunistic	discourse:	moral	values	are	a	technique	for	safeguarding	political	power.	Considering	moral	
values as political instruments belongs to the rhetoric and to the strategy of those statesmen	like	Shang	Yang	and	Han	Feizi.	For	instance	Han	Feizi	states	that	“the	
things which [the people] like and dislike are controlled by the ruler. […] When 
the ruler manipulates the people’s likes and dislikes in order to command their 
strength, there is no reason for him to fail in his undertakings.”	75 The appeal for	virtue	is	a	technique	in	the	hands	of	the	ruler.The	redeinition	of	the	notion	of	the	“people	as	root”	plays	on	the	emotive	meaning	of	the	term	“people.”	According	to	the	argument	developed	in	the	“Great	Command,	Part	I,”	the	people	are	a	formless	entity	and	an	“accumulation	of	foolishness,”	basically	a	loose	cannon	on	the	ship	of	the	state.	Jia	Yi	develops	
a paternalistic and elitist argument, but at the same time he is very well aware of the	people’s	power.	Jia	Yi’s	strong	emphasis	on	the	role	of	the	people	stresses	the	ruler/subject	reciprocity.	Jia	Yi	views	the	people	as	the	“root”	of	political	affairs,	focusing	on	the	vital	inluence	they	have	on	the	stability	of	the	government	and,	
most importantly, on victory in battle. In ensuring the stable position of the ruler, 
the role of the people and their motivation are fundamental not only in times 
of war, but also in times of peace. The people still are an unstable mass to be 
controlled and kept in order.
73. Jiazi,	“Great	Command,	Part	I”:	995.74. Jiazi,	“Great	Command,	Part	I”:	996-997.75. 而好惡者，к之所制也 [...] к掌好惡以御民力，事實н宜失矣。 Han Feizi, “On Ruling	and	the	Assignment	of	Responsibilities”	(Zhi	fen	制分).
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The	argument	of	the	“people	as	root”	focuses	on	the	techniques	used	to	
control and marshal the people to win the battle and secure stable government, with	the	inal	point	concerning	the	oficials.	Jia	Yi	explains	the	importance	of	the	people	as	follows:
The people are the root of regional lords, teaching is the root of policy, moral conduct 
is the root of teaching. If you have moral conduct, then you have teaching; if you 
have teaching, then your policy will be ordered; if your policy is ordered, then the 
people will be diligent; if you have diligent people, then and only then will the state 
be prosperous and thriving.	76
Jia	Yi’s	political	rhetoric	connects	fundamental	concepts	to	set	up	a	sequence	
from “the people as the root of regional lords” to a “prosperous and thriving state.”	However,	his	justiication	of	controlling	the	people	through	moral	conduct	
insinuates the “emotive force” of the idea of the “people as root.” Social virtues 
aim to use the people’s strength. In a time when the court was dominated by those	who	had	risen	to	inluence	through	military	action,	Jia	Yi	resorted	to	the	
use of fear as a political emotion in order to restrain the social mobility of the 
“people,” the unreliable grassroots support for the government.
Conclusion
The	common	interpretation	of	Jia	Yi’s	idea	of	min ben	in	terms	of	Mengzi’s	thought	needs	more	careful	analysis.	While	Mengzi	underlines	the	importance	of	adopting	a	policy	of	magnanimity	and	muniicence	towards	the	people	in	order	to	have	their	support,	Jia	Yi	warns	of	the	potential	threat	they	represent:	
in his view, the people are basically dangerous. Indulging the people is a way 
of controlling them; it is instrumental for success in war and the stability of the	ruler.	For	Jia	Yi,	“cherishing	the	people”	and	“beneiting	the	people”	are	techniques	used	by	the	best	of	rulers.	77	Jia	Yi	wants	to	consolidate	imperial	
power, and this is why he emphasises the need to control the unreliable root of 
the state. Failure to control on the ground leads to unstable government and the collapse	of	the	dynasty.	Jia	Yi’s	reasoning	regarding	the	“people	as	the	root”	of	policy	is	based	on	persuasion	through	the	redeinition	of	terms.	The	ultimate	
goal is to convince the ruler of the threat the people—the grassroots of the empire—can	represent.	Jia	Yi	elaborates	different	Warring	State’s	ideas,	often	
contradictory, and accommodate them in order to smooth out the authoritarian 
76. Jiazi,	“Great	Command,	Part	II”:	1015.77.	 See	also	Sanft	2005a:	37.
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and repressive nature of Han institutions, which the Han dynasty was soon to 
put into practice.
Finally, modern ideas of democracy and human rights are far from the 
ancient Chinese meaning of “the people as root,” and the importance of the 
people in the political scenario must be considered in a different way. Such is the 
emotive content packed into this expression that it is still used for effect today 
and although it does not apply to true people-oriented politics, it does offer a 
convenient formula that can be adapted to serve the needs of intellectuals and 
policies of any period. Even so, while it is true that in modern times the term “people”	has	usually	strongly	positive	overtones,	in	Jia	Yi’s	day	it	conjured	up	visions	of	an	uncontrollable	rabble,	which	only	a	short	time	before	had	joined	forces	and	brought	down	the	Qin	dynasty.	In	view	of	the	numbers	involved,	it	
is hardly surprising the term was loaded with negative associations.
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